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CABINING THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF THE NEW DEAL IN TIME
G. Edward White*
THE

SUPREME

COURT

Ti
ROOSEVELT.

REBORN:

CONSTITUTIONAL

By William E.
Leuchtenburg. New York: Oxford University Press. 1995. Pp. ix,
350. $30.
REVOLUTION

IN THE AGE

OF

The constitutional history of the New Deal period, which can
roughly be defined as spanning the years from the early 1930s
through the Second World War, appears to be moving closer to the
forefront of our contemporary consciousness. It is now not uncommon for commentators on current constitutional law issues to enlist
"the New Deal" as a symbol, either of the bright and shining "moment" in which the American constitutional system adapted to modernity' or of the willful and misguided creation of that alleged
2
source of many of our present ills, the welfare state.
When a period from the past begins to take on a particular
resonance with the present, a "new history" of that period almost
invariably emerges. I suspect that a new history of the New Deal is
in the process of being formed, and I believe that an important focal point of that history will be the series of Supreme Court constitutional law decisions that William Leuchtenburg 3 characterizes as
a "constitutional revolution" during which the Court experienced a
"rebirth." One might surmise from the title and subtitle of
Leuchtenburg's book, in fact, that it is part of that new history.
* University Professor and John B. Minor Professor of Law and History, University of
Virginia. B.A. 1963, Amherst; M.A. 1964, Ph.D. 1967, Yale; J.D. 1970, Harvard. - Ed. My
thanks to Michael D'Agostino, Neil Devins, and Michael Klarman for their comments on an
earlier draft of this review.
1. See, eg., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 105 (1991); Cass R.
Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter The New Deal, 101 HARV.L. REV. 421,422 (1987). Following Dorothy Ross, by "modernity" I mean "the actual world brought into existence by democracy, capitalism, social differentiation, and scien[tific technology]." Dorothy Ross,

ModernistReconsidered, in MODERNIST IMPULSES INTHE HUMAN SCIENCES: 1870-1930, at 1,
8 (Dorothy Ross ed., 1994) [hereinafter MODERNIST IMPULSES]. The supporters of New Deal
policies took for granted the modernity of the world, and they saw New Deal policies as
responsive to and constitutive of the salient elements of modernity.

2. See, eg.,

RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EM!.

DOMAIN 280-81 (1985); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State,
107 HARv.L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994).
3. William Rand Kenan Professor of History, University of North Carolina; Visiting Professor of Legal History, Duke Law School.
NEr-r

1392

Supreme Court History

May 1996]

1393

I have concluded, however, for reasons that will occupy me for
the bulk of this review, that Leuchtenburg has done something
quite different in The Supreme Court Reborn. Rather than offering
a new constitutional history of the New Deal period, he offers a
conventional, traditionalist view, one that arguably fails even to attempt, let alone to accomplish, the task of any new history, that of
cabining a historical era in time. The most interesting and perhaps
telling feature of Leuchtenburg's account of the "constitutional
revolution" of the 1930s is one of his implicit starting assumptions.
He assumes that in order for us to appreciate the magnitude of that
revolution, he need only describe it, not explain it. He assumes, in
other words, that we will grasp his interpretation of the constitutional history of the New Deal merely from being exposed to the
details he provides.
To understand why Leuchtenburg - widely viewed as an experienced and skilled practitioner of archival narrative history and as
an unimpeachably credentialed "expert" on the subjects he discusses in The Supreme Court Reborn4 - felt that his readers would
grasp the meaning of the New Deal constitutional revolution from
such details, it is necessary to take two excursions away from those
details, one into the realm of writing history generally and the
other, at greater length, into what I call the inferential structure of
Leuchtenburg's historical narrative in The Supreme Court Reborn.
I conclude by summarizing the ways in which I find Leuchtenburg's
history conventional and at the same time unsatisfying, and by proposing some lines of questioning that need to be undertaken before
the constitutional developments of the New Deal period can adequately be cabined in time.
I.

THE IMPULSE

To "Do HISTORY"

In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries there have been
periods in which the American legal profession has treated the historical analysis of legal subjects and issues as an important mission
of legal scholarship, and periods in which it has treated such analy4. In his preface to The Supreme Court Reborn, Leuchtenburg notes that since 1962 he
has been studying the "Court-packing Crisis" of 1937 and the developments in constitutional
law that preceded and succeeded it. He also informs us that his synthetic histories span every
period in American history from 1914 until the present. Finally, he mentions that he is currently working on a two-volume history of "the constitutional crisis of the 1930s." See pp. viiix, 26.
Leuchtenburg's previous work on the New Deal period has been well received. One reviewer of The Supreme Court Reborn describes him as "perhaps the preeminent New Deal
historian." Neal Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96 COLuM. L. REV. 237,
239 (1996) (book review). Leuchtenburg also seems prominent among and respected by his
peers. He has served as president of the American Historical Association and the Organization of American Historians, and he has won both the George Bancroft and Francis Parkman
Prizes, coveted honors within the profession of Americanist historians.
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sis as distinctly marginal to the enterprise. One might compare the
years from 1870 through the early 1920s with the years between the
1930s and the 1960s. During the former period, Harvard's
Christopher Columbus Langdell, whose model of a law faculty was
eventually to dominate the profession, assembled a faculty of "expounders, systematizers, and historians." 5 During the latter period,
by contrast, only a handful of law schools had legal historians on
their faculties, relatively few pieces of historical scholarship appeared in law reviews, and many in the profession regarded "doing
6
history" as an antiquarian or obscurantist exercise.
One could, in fact, trace a connection over the course of the
twentieth century between the legal academy's enthusiasm for contemporary issues of law and policy and its lack of interest in doing
history. When legal academics were engaged by and saw themselves as important contributors to issues of public policy - during
the periods of administrative regulation in the 1930s and 1940s and
constitutional reform in the 1950s and 1960s, for example - legal
history appeared to them less meaningful and consequently more
obscurantist. Alternatively, when legal academics found themselves disaffected with the orientation of contemporary policymaking, systemic and theoretical approaches to law and policy came
into vogue. This occurred in the 1970s and 1980s 7 and also, to a
degree, in the years between World War I and the decade of the
1930s. In the 1920s, for example, several members of elite law
school faculties became invested in the American Law Institute's
(ALI) efforts to systematize the principles of common law in its
Restatement of the Law project, and those participants were united
5. See CHARLEs W. ELIOT, REPORT OF THE NmNTm ANNUAL MEETING, IN ESPECIAL
HONOR OF CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL 70 (1895), quoted in ARTHUR E. SrrrRLArN, THE LAW AT HARVARD 184 n.28 (1967).

6. American law reviews of the 1940s or 1950s had a relatively ahistorical orientation as
compared with the 1920s or the 1970s. According to the Index to Legal Periodicals,legal
journals published fewer than 254 "legal history" articles in the entire decade of the 1950s,
while 333 such articles appeared in the three-year period from September 1976 to August
1979. See 9 INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS 390-91 (1952) (covering August, 1949 to July,
1952); 10 INDEX TO LEGAL PERIDICALS 371 (1955) (covering August, 1952 to July, 1955); 11
INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS 356-57 (1958) (covering August, 1955 to July, 1958); 12 INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS 399-400 (1961) (covering August, 1958 to August, 1961); 18
INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS 872-77 (1979) (covering September, 1976 to August, 1979).

Even allowing for the increase in law review scholarship and indexed law journals between
1960 and 1976, the comparison appears striking.
For additional evidence of the general tendency of the legal academy, for at least three
decades beginning in the 1930s, to treat scholarly projects in legal history as marginal or
uninspiring, I might offer the testimony of those of us who began teaching law in the early
1970s with a shared interest in legal history and a shared enthusiasm for the scholarly opportunities in the area. Only one or two of us, in job interviews, were encouraged to pursue legal
history as a scholarly field, and a number were actively discouraged. After garnering initial
reactions, many of us decided to identify ourselves with other more "mainstream" subjects.
7. See, eg., Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 19621987, 100 HARv. L. REV. 761 (1987).
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in their confidence that they could do a far better job of8 "law reform" than official policymakers, such as state legislators.
History, which offers explanations for why the currently dominant attitudes and practices of policymaking remain in place even
when they seem dysfunctional, can be seen as a systemic scholarly
methodology. It also can be seen as a subversive enterprise. A
sense of disquiet about the orientation of contemporary policymaking can spur historical research, and the findings can contribute to
that disquiet. Through temporal comparison, historical studies frequently suggest that governing assumptions about "the way things
are," which lead us to endorse certain practices or policies, are not
universal, but rather time bound, contingent, and even fortuitous.
The New Deal as a historical subject furnishes a suggestive
example.
The New Deal arguably ended, in the sense of its political, economic, and legal upheavals, over fifty years ago. It left in place,
however, a governmental apparatus, at both the federal and state
levels, of hitherto unprecedented magnitude in American life.
Over the course of the past fifty years changes in the political and
economic climate of American society - renewed prosperity and
the realignment of the party affiliations of various constituent
groups being only two examples - have altered the context of New
Deal practices and policies. Moreover, after the Second World War
both the doctrinal orientation of constitutional law and the Court's
self-fashioned role as an overseer of at least a significant component of legislative activity - activity affecting civil rights and civil
liberties - have represented discernible changes from the New
Deal period. Finally, on the level of popular culture, a succession of
political slogans designed to identify the Democratic party with a
legacy from the 1930s - Fair Deal, New Frontier, Great Society also can be seen as signifying the implicit assignment of the "New
Deal" to a particular period in time.
Thus in one sense the New Deal unmistakably has receded into
the past. But it also has retained a continuity with the present in at
least one major respect. The significant political, economic, and
legal changes of the past fifty years have not been paralleled by a
comparable change in the arguably "revolutionary" relationship between the "public" and "private" spheres of American life that the
New Deal established. Prior to the 1930s government had, by any
account, a minimalist presence, a reflection of its meager regulatory
and distributive capacities. Since the New Deal, government at
8. For an argument that the formation of the ALI and the Restatement project can be
seen as intuitive efforts on the part of elite sectors of the legal profession to come to grips
with the perceived "uncertainty" and "complexity" of modernity, see G. Edward white, The
American Law Institute and the Emergence of ModernistJurisprudence,15 LAw & HisT. Rv.
(forthcoming 1997).
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both the state and federal levels has become an increasingly prominent and ubiquitous force.
The increased presence of government in American life has arguably been less revolutionary than the accompanying change in
conceptions about what government represents and about what
portions of American society are appropriate subjects of governmental action. Prior to the New Deal, theories of governance assumed the existence of a substantial "private" sphere of American
life, a vast, general domain that government could invade only for
specially conferred "public" purposes. Since the New Deal, we take
the government to have general regulatory powers limited only by
special freedoms conferred on individuals or groups. The New
Deal thus represents a sea change in conceptions of the appropriate
boundaries for the "public" and "private" sectors of American life,
and that change in conceptions remains with us still.
This change in the conception of government and of the relationship between governmental powers and private freedoms has
had, in my judgment, a decisive effect on the overwhelming majority of historians who have chosen to write on the New Deal.
Whatever historical subjects the members of this group of historians have chosen to address, two common messages - one explicit
and the other implicit - have emanated from their accounts. They
have argued explicitly, in monograph after monograph and in
Leuchtenburg's synthetic works, that the governing apparatus of
American society ushered in by the New Deal bore no resemblance
to any governing apparatus that had existed previously. 9 In addition, they have argued implicitly, indeed taken for granted, that the
New Deal governing apparatus is still our apparatus; that the world
of affirmative government created in the New Deal is still our
world. Thus the conventional history of the New Deal has created
an unmistakable inference: as contemporary Americans we remain
"connected" to the New Deal and to the events and ideas that made
affirmative government necessary and desirable in America.
I find that this inference imposes a limitation on our ability to
fashion a history of the New Deal that satisfies a central requirement of any work of historical scholarship that aspires to professional stature and a decent shelf life. The requirement is that the
history confine its subject to a distinctive period in time, a period
that is separate from the one in which the history is being written.
If we are to accept the inference of our continuing connection to
the New Deal, it would appear that we cannot fashion a truly systemic or truly subversive historical account of that period. The assumed connections between the revolutionary New Deal theories of
9. See, eg., Wuti
326-48 (1963).

E. LEucH-rNBURG, FA
AzuN D. RoOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL
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governance and our current theories suggest that we are not yet in a
position to entertain seriously alternatives to those theories of governance and thus to see the conceptual changes of the New Deal as
time-bound and contingent. As long as we instinctively embrace
pervasive affirmative government, we cannot fully contemplate
either the world that preceded the New Deal, in which affirmative
government was exceptional rather than usual, or imagine a future
in which affirmative government might be significantly reduced or
new boundaries between the public and private spheres of American life fashioned. Until then we cannot cabin the New Deal in
time.
Such assumptions about the relationship between New Deal
theories of governance and current theories inform Leuchtenburg's
constitutional history of the New Deal. To him, we remain participants in the revolutionary governmental innovations of that time.
He believes that when we look back at the political or economic
dislocations of the New Deal era and at the legal responses to those
dislocations, our instinctive reactions replicate those of the New
Dealers.
Therefore, for Leuchtenburg, the history of the constitutional
revolution is a history of how our current world of governance
came into being. He begins by exposing us to the unprecedented
social and economic problems of the 1930s and by making us recognize the inability of the "Old Court"' 0 to deal with those problems
or to understand the solutions proposed by the New Deal Congresses and the Roosevelt administrations. He goes on to demonstrate the capacity of the "New Court"" to embrace those solutions
quickly and flexibly. Finally, he invites us to consider how the increased presence of government in the New Deal fostered "[t]he
birth of America's second bill of rights" (p. 237). Leuchtenburg
suggests that the eventual application of many of the provisions of
the Bill of Rights to the states through their incorporation in the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment evolved from a
consciousness, originating in the New Deal years, that although legislative bodies properly regulate the obsolescent economic "liberties" of what Justice James McReynolds referred to as "the former
order,"' 12 they also pose a threat to noneconomic liberties.
10. Leuchtenburg defines the "Old Court" as "the Supreme Court of the pre-1937 era,"
which originally resisted and then embraced New Deal legislation. P. 226. For Leuchtenburg
the year 1937 amounts to a watershed in American constitutional history. See infra text accompanying notes 39-40.
11. By the "New Court" Leuchtenburg means the Court that "[b]eginning in 1937 ...
upheld every New Deal statute that came before it." P. 225. Because there were no personnel changes on the Court until after the 1937 Term, Leuchtenburg obviously intends "Old"
and "New" to signify changes in attitudes more than changes in personnel.
12. See p. 155 (quoting a letter from James McReynolds to Dr. Robert F. McReynolds
(Oct. 30, 1937) (on file with the University of Virginia)). The context of McReynolds's re-
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In the construction of history, Leuchtenburg fails to address an
issue that arguably forms an elemental part of any project of historical scholarship, and his failure is shared by most participants in the
conventional historiography of the New Deal. The issue can be
simply put: Why did those actors, in the New Deal period, who
decided to reinterpret the Constitution to permit a much greater
governmental regulatory presence, act as they did? They acted, to
be sure; their legislative proposals and constitutional decisions "revolutionized" the power and the presence of government in
America. Why did they assume that the particular set of social and
economic conditions they faced in the 1930s required so profound a
response?
Why, in sum, did the legal actors of the New Deal period decide
to supplant one conception of government - one which took a
general realm of private activity, presumptively untouched by the
state, as the norm, and required special justification for state intrusions into that realm - with another conception, which took the
general regulatory powers of government as the norm and treated
individual freedoms against the state as being specially conferred?
Why did they abandon one longstanding theory of the relationship
of the public and private spheres in America in favor of its virtual
opposite?
As was apparent to their contemporaries, those who proposed
or sustained the legislative mandate of the New Deal had associated
themselves with a revolutionary conception of government inAmerica. For evidence of that perception, one only need look at
opinions in which Supreme Court majorities or dissenters declare
various pieces of New Deal legislation unconstitutional.
Leuchtenburg outlines the New Deal legislative agenda and discusses many of those opinions, yet he never offers an explanation of
the intellectual bases of the conceptual shift or, for that matter, of
the intellectual bases of constitutional opinions resisting that shift.
The message that follows from this seems somewhat unsettling.
Leuchtenburg's readers apparently are supposed to conclude that
the conceptual shift in the meaning of government that took place
during the New Deal was necessary and inevitable, given the times,
and that resistance to it demonstrated a lack of awareness of the
"realities" of modernity. Leuchtenburg assumes that if he presents
all the details of the change, his readers, themselves still situated
within the New Deal universe of affirmative government, instinctively will understand the theoretical basis of that change. As such,
the defining element of the New Deal - its revolutionary theory of
mark was the opening of the Supreme Court's 1937 Term. "The Court starts off much as I
expected," he wrote his brother. "There is not much to be expected of it by sensible people
of the former order." Id.

May 1996]

Supreme Court History

the role of government in America ined in Leuchtenburg's history.
II.

THE

1399

remains essentially unexam-

INFRENTIAL STRUCTURE OF LEUCHTENBURG'S
NARRATIVE

I have been arguing that Leuchtenburg believes that the revolutionary quality of the New Deal era can be conveyed through a catalog of details, the meaning of which will be obvious to
contemporary readers still "connected" to that period of history.
One could argue that this reading, even if accurate, does not limit
the value of Leuchtenburg's work. The Supreme Court Reborn,
such an arguinent might suggest, is in the genre of narrative history,
in which the author weaves a variety of inaccessible information,
much of it from archival sources, into an unintrusive and readable
"story." From this point of view, Leuchtenburg wants the details of
his narrative "to speak for themselves" and does not want to intrude upon them with undue analysis or speculation so that their
impact becomes more dramatic and more powerful.
At first blush this relatively modest view of historical analysis, in
which the historian subordinates himself to the story, appears to be
consistent with the narrative structure of The Supreme Court Reborn.13 Leuchtenburg begins the book, for example, with a chapter
on Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's opinion for the Court in Buck
v. Bell1 4 and relates the poignant tale of Carrie Buck's involuntary
sterilization. Leuchtenburg explains that the Court's decision
rested on a false ground - that Buck was a "moron" - and that it
actually reflected the enthusiasm of both the Virginia legislature
and Holmes for the eugenics movement. The chapter presents no
new information on either Carrie Buck or the case in general. 15
Nonetheless, it is a masterful and compelling narrative synthesis,
ending sixty-one years after the event, with the discovery by Carrie's sister Doris that Carrie's "appendectomy" in the Lynchburg,
13. One reviewer concludes that Leuchtenburg has "serve[d] up a series of integrally interconnected essays ...without explaining how they speak to each other" and that "[i]n
large
measure, this is intentional": Leuchtenburg "leaves the reader alone to draw ultimate conclusions about the Roosevelt Revolution." Devins, supra note 4, at 239.
14. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).

15. For sources that do provide further information on Carrie Buck or Buck v. Bell, see J.
DAVID SMrm & K. RAY NELSON, Tim STmURIuZAON OF CARRIE BUCK (1989); Walter
Berns, Buck v. Bell: Due Processof Law?, 6 W. PoL.Q. 772 (1953); Robert J.Cynkar, Buck
v. Bell: 'Felt Necessities v. FundamentalValues?, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1418 (1981); Mary L.
Dudziak, Oliver Wendell Holmes as a Eugenic Reformer: Rhetoric in the Writing of Constitutional Law, 71 IOWA L. REV. 833, 855-59 (1986); Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations,No
Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (1985), all of which
Leuchtenburg cites. For evidence of Holmes's obvious pleasure in reaching the result in
Buck v. Bell, see G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs 408 (1993).
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Virginia, State Colony
for Epileptics and Feeble-Minded had been
6
a salpingectomy.'
Leuchtenburg draws no connection between his account of
Buck v. Bell and the chapters that follow, and this episodic pattern
tends to characterize his book throughout. In a thirty-two page
chapter on Hugo Black's appointment to the Supreme Court, for
example, only the last two pages mention Black's role in the constitutional revolution, which Leuchtenburg believes followed the 1936
Term. In like manner, Leuchtenburg's last chapter, a history of the
application of the Bill of Rights to the states, ranges from the years
after the Civil War to the late 1960s and devotes only three of
twenty-one pages to the New Deal period. 17 Leuchtenburg does
not attempt at any point to integrate his chapters or to suggest their
historiographic implications. One might well conclude that he simply wants to engage the reader with some vignettes from twentiethcentury constitutional history.
Nevertheless, a closer look at Leuchtenburg's chapters reveals
not only that they fit with one another, but that their topical and
chronological arrangement creates a series of interconnected inferences that give meaning to his narrative history. That meaning
might be described as follows: The New Deal and the constitutional revolution that accompanied it demonstrated that certain established presuppositions about American life - reflected in the
system of unregulated capitalism, relatively rigid definitions of the
respective powers of the branches of government, and the relative
unconcern among policymakers for the welfare of socially and economically disadvantaged persons - had suddenly grown "old" and
were unresponsive to the altered conditions of modem America.
The New Deal encompasses the moment in time in which policymakers confronted the senescence of those presuppositions and
abandoned them for "new" ones.
This meaning may not seem startling. A number of significant
policy changes occurred around the time of the New Deal, and the
Roosevelt administration defended its efforts to "pack" the
Supreme Court in 1937, the pivotal episode of Leuchtenburg's narrative, by arguing that the Justices who had resisted the first wave
of New Deal legislation had done so because they were "too old."
The Court-packing plan itself dealt directly with age, providing for
the appointment of an additional Justice when a sitting Justice declined to retire at the age of seventy. One could conclude that
Leuchtenburg successfully introduces a fair amount of contempo16. See p. 25. "My husband and me wanted children desperate," Doris Buck Figgins told
a Washington Post reporter a year after discovering that she had been sterilized. "I never
knew what they'd done to me." P. 25 (quoting WAsH. Posr, Feb. 23, 1980).
17. See pp. 249-52 (discussing First Amendment cases from 1937 through 1941).
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rary sources equating age and obsolescent attitudes with opposition
to the New Deal.
When one emphasizes the assumed connectedness between the
New Deal and our contemporary universe, however,
Leuchtenburg's characterizations of New Deal policies as new, and
of resistance to those policies as old, take on an expanded meaning.
"New" becomes equated with "currently treated as natural and appropriate," and "old" with "alien and obsolescent." As a result The
Supreme Court Reborn becomes a version of "winner's history," in
which readers are taken as assuming that modem attitudes and theories about economic regulation, separation of powers, the socially
and economically disadvantaged, and above all the role of government originated in the New Deal. The "losing" attitudes towards
those issues, on the other hand, are not taken seriously, but dismissed as old and as representative of a "former order." Consequently, the magnitude of the conceptual shift about the role of
government during the New Deal is taken for granted, but never
explained. Indeed, Leuchtenburg proceeds as if he need not explain it because its starting assumptions, being our own, already
have been vindicated.
Let us now consider Leuchtenburg's narrative presentation with
this inferential message in mind. The message seems consistent
with a division of his narrative into three sections: Chapters One
through Three, where he describes and criticizes the attitudes of the
"former order"; Chapters Four through Six, where he shows how
the message of those attitudes' obsolescence was internalized, thus
becoming an explicit dimension of twentieth-century constitutional
history; and Chapters Seven through Nine, where he demonstrates
how the new attitudes identified with the New Deal were put into
place and a constitutional revolution occurred. Throughout this
narration Leuchtenburg conveys his message implicitly, through
evocative language, rather than through explicit interpretive
arguments.
In Chapter One, on Buck v. Bell, Leuchtenburg attempts to
show the callousness of pre-New Deal elite policymakers to the
plight of disadvantaged persons. He describes the eugenics movement as having a "transparent class bias" and as embodying a
"heartlessness toward the handicapped" (p. 6). In his mind, "[e]lite
groups ... had an economic motivation for endorsing eugenics....
[T]hey thought the country was being taxed excessivelyto support a
burgeoning class of morons" (p. 8). He also contends that eugenics
was declining in scientific stature by the late 1920s. It had "run into
a cross fire of criticism." He notes that "by 1927 only the most
sheltered Justice could have failed to know that eugenics had increasingly come into dispute" (pp. 20-21). Unfortunately, Holmes
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was just such a sheltered Justice. He was eighty-six at the time he
wrote the opinion in Buck, and the opinion "shows... his allegiance to elite attitudes" and his "insensitivity to the position of
women in a sexist society and to the class prejudice inherent in the
legislation" (p. 21). Leuchtenburg concludes that Holmes's opinion
in Buck "shows the revered 'Yankee from Olympus' at his worst"
(p. 19). However, the "decision may well have been inevitable" (p.
23): Louis Brandeis and Harlan Fiske Stone joined Holmes's opinion. Indeed, "1927 was too soon," in Leuchtenburg's view, "for the
Court to reverse Virginia's highest court in a case such as Buck.' 8
From Buck Leuchtenburg turns in Chapter TWo to the 1935
Supreme Court case of Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton
Railroad Co.,19 in which the Court reviewed the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934. He characterizes Alton as a decision that
"gravely affected the future prospects of [the Roosevelt administration's] program, created deep fissures between the executive branch
and the... Court[,] and left two million railroad workers, past and
present, embittered and bereft" (p. 27). He prepares the reader for
the Alton case by noting that
[t]he eight years separating Buck from [that] case saw ... drastic
change in the circumstances in which the Court operated ....The
Wall Street crash of 1929 and the ensuring Great Depression had led
to emergency legislation.., by Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New
Deal that raised stark challenges to the constitutional orthodoxy expounded in the 1920s. [p. 26]
In his view, Alton tested "the attitude of the Court toward the New
Deal" (p. 26) and demonstrated that the Court had a lack of sympathy to Roosevelt's domestic agenda. Justice Roberts, for a 5-4 majority, invalidated the Act on due process and commerce power
grounds. Leuchtenburg's narrative emphasizes two features of the
Alton case: the close connection between the legislation and the
economic circumstances under which it was drafted, and the utter
indifference of the Roberts majority to those circumstances, which
included the plight of discharged railroad workers. This emphasis
relegates the constitutional basis of the decision to relative insignificance. In fact, Leuchtenburg directs much more attention to criti18. P. 23. By referring to the Supreme Court of Virginia, Leuchtenburg means to suggest
that the Court was not inclined at the time "to strike down any state law on the grounds that
the liberties protected by the Bill of Rights against federal enforcement also are safeguarded
from violation by state governments through incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment."
P. 23. This is a curious statement, because incorporation would not have been necessary.
Four years earlier, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), the Court held that "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause encompassed the right "to marry
...and bring up children." Leuchtenburg himself points this out. See p. 23. Moreover, the
legacy of the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence already encouraged aggressive
review of state legislation when "liberties" were at stake. See Adkins v. Children's Hospital,
261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923).

19. 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
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ques of Roberts's reasoning than to explanations of it.20 These
critiques, piled one upon another, demonstrate how the decision infuriated its opponents, and how this fury spilled over into the Court
itself. As Leuchtenburg concludes:
The rail pension ruling indeed had been a turning point .... If the
thinking that Roberts revealed ... prevailed, the Welfare State would
be stillborn. From that day forward, neither Roosevelt nor his aides
would rest until they had found a way to overcome the obstacle to
their plans presented by the Court. [p. 51]
One can easily grasp the inferential messages of Leuchtenburg's
narrative on the Alton case from its descriptive language. Consider
the following examples. The day that the decision was handed
down, May 6, 1935, was "one of the most fateful days in the constitutional crisis of the Great Depression." The Depression "dealt
savagely with the railroad industry," and the railroad "fired more
than two out of every five railway workers" between 1929 and 1933,
so that "[b]y the late summer of 1932 more than 760,000 railroad
workers had lost their jobs." Given "a rigid seniority rule" in the
railroad industry, "the massive layoffs after 1929 drove hundreds of
thousands of the youngest men into the ranks of the unemployed."
Carriers had established private pension plans, "but they were
highly unsatisfactory. The amounts of the pensions were small,
only a limited number of railroaders at a very advanced age were
eligible, and the carriers could abolish the programs at their whim"
(pp. 28, 29, 31).
Leuchtenburg explains that railroad workers had powerful unions - railway "brotherhoods" - that had some "political clout"
in Congress. These brotherhoods induced Senator Robert Wagner
of New York, a known friend of the labor movement, to introduce a
bill in 1932 that would impose a pension system, to which both carriers and employees would contribute, for the railroad industry.
Supporters contended that the system would promote operational
efficiency and safety in interstate commerce by creating incentives
for "older and less alert people" to retire. The bill made railroad
workers eligible for pensions at age 65, after 30 years of service, or
after being disabled on the job. It made no provisions for government contributions to the pension system, and its benefits extended
to both former and current workers (pp. 31-32).
After President Roosevelt signed the Railroad Retirement Act
in 1934, the railroads immediately challenged it on constitutional
grounds. In October of that year the Supreme Court of the District
of Columbia found it to violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Pro20. Leuchtenburg devotes six pages to describing Roberts's opinion, only about half of
which discuss his actual arguments. At the same time, he devotes twelve pages to the criticism of it by the dissenting Justices and others. See pp. 34-51.
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cess Clause and the Commerce Clause. That court concluded that
the Act unfairly took money from the carriers and gave it to workers, many of whom were no longer their employees and no longer
engaged in interstate commerce. Roberts invoked those very
grounds in invalidating the statute on appeal. Nonetheless
Leuchtenburg characterizes Roberts's opinion as "often hard to distinguish... from the brief for the railroads" (p. 35).
Leuchtenburg's description of the Alton case suggests that
Roberts quickly dismissed the arguments in support of the Act.
Roberts "brushed... aside" the justification for including workers
no longer employed by the railroads, which was "to safeguard those
who had been laid off temporarily from having their long years of
past service expunged, and to make certain that carriers did not
refuse to rehire them in order to escape the burden of pension obligations" (p. 35). In like manner, Roberts "scoffed at the claim" that
the legislation "improved the morale of employees who would
know that they would lose their pension rights if they were discharged" (p. 36). Roberts "made little effort to conceal his contempt both for the legislators who had created this monstrosity and
for the attorneys who sought to persuade the Court that it was a
legitimate exercise of the powers of Congress" (p. 37). Roberts's
response to the Railroad Retirement Act, for Leuchtenburg,
demonstrated that "his conception of the relation of employer and
employee ... was almost medieval in nature" (p. 39; internal quotation marks omitted):
He thought of workers as owing fealty and "gratitude" to management. Any benefits they received resulted from the generosity of businessmen who dispensed "largess" or "gratuities" or "bounty" to local
hands. They were not social rights to which one was entitled in an
industrial society.... Theactual hard lot of the railroad men - more
than half of whom had been dismissed in only three years because of
the exigencies of the Great Depression - could not penetrate such a
frame of mind. [p. 38]
The emotive theme of Leuchtenburg's chapter on the Alton case
thus centers on a juxtaposition of the plight of discharged railroad
workers in a depressed economy and the "medieval frame of mind"
of Justice Roberts. Because Roberts cannot sympathize with the
"actual hard lot of the railroad men," he cannot conceive of pensions as "social rights to which one was entitled in an industrial society" (p. 39). One might point out that there was a good deal more
contained in Roberts's attitude toward the Railroad Retirement
Act challenged in Alton. He also saw it as a "naked appropriation
of private property"; a violation of the traditional prohibition in
American constitutional jurisprudence against a legislature's "taking the property of one and bestowing it on another"; an unprecedented restructuring of the boundaries between government and
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the private sector; and an effort "to substitute legislative largess for
private bounty and thus [to] transfer the drive for pensions to the
halls of Congress and [to]
transmute loyalty to employer into gratitude to the legislature."'21
Leuchtenburg takes no interest, however, in exploring these
dimensions of Roberts's opinion in the Alton case. His emphasis is
solely on demonstrating how the patent insensitivity of the opinion,
given its failure to grasp "the exigencies of the Great Depression,"
made it especially provocative to supporters of the New Deal. Indeed it was the Alton decision, Leuchtenburg suggests, that set in
motion the forces that would eventually lead to the Court-packing
proposal. "Though there had been some muttering about the need
to curb the powers of the Supreme Court before," he states, "the
rail pension case galvanized organized labor, liberal Congressmen,
and the Roosevelt administration to take the first serious efforts in
that direction" (p. 49).
Having demonstrated the elitist and outmoded conceptions of
modem life that made Court majorities in both Buck and Alton insensitive to the lot of the underclasses and to the casualties of the
Depression, Leuchtenburg next seeks to generate momentum for
the centerpiece of his narrative, the Court-packing plan. In order
to do so, he devotes a chapter to the Court's decision in
Humphrey's Executor v. United States.22 Humphrey unanimously
curbed the President's power to discharge a commissioner of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) without cause on separation of
powers grounds. Although it distinguished out of existence an earlier Supreme Court case allowing the President to remove a federal
Postmaster,23 Humphrey did not generate the outcry that Alton
had, primarily because it was seen as an affirmation of the independent, nonpartisan ideal of federal administrative agencies (p.
75).
21. Alton, 295 U.S. at 330, 350-51. Recent scholarship in legal and constitutional history
has emphasized the degree to which, over the period stretching from at least the 1830s
through the 1930s, the power of government to remedy inequalities in the market, or in the
private sector generally, traditionally was limited to responses that served a legitimate "public purpose" and that benefited and burdened all actors in that sector equally, as distinguished from responses that favored the interests of some classes at the expense of others.
See e.g., HowARD GILL AN, Tnn CoNs'nruoN BESIEGED (1993). Although that tradition,
which saw social and economic inequalities as either "natural" or market-driven rather than
as endemic to an industrial capitalist society, was arguably on the defensive from the early
twentieth century on, see id. at 132-59, it was still in place at the time of the Alton case. See
id. at 189-90. One of the cornerstone principles of that constitutional tradition was that "a
law that takes property from A. and gives it to B.... is against all reason and justice." Id. at
127 (citations omitted).
22. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
23. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). In Myers Chief Justice Taft, hoping to
extend the impact of the decision, added language suggesting that Presidential removal
power extended to independent regulatory commissions. The Court in Humphrey specifically rejected that language. See 295 U.S. at 626.
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Leuchtenburg, however, sees Humphrey as important because it
infuriated Roosevelt. Roosevelt expected to be able to remove
William Humphrey at his pleasure, and he had been advised, on the
basis of the earlier precedent, that he would be able to do so (pp.
68-69). Leuchtenburg suggests that Roosevelt took the decision
personally, as Justice Sutherland's opinion for the Court gave no
signal that the Roosevelt administration could have fairly relied on
the precedent, which was nine years old, and because Roosevelt
very much wanted to "shape... economic policy" through the FTC.
Leuchtenburg concludes the chapter by asserting that "in February
1937, [when] Roosevelt precipitated the historic controversy over
his endeavor to 'pack' the Supreme Court, a number of his opponents traced the conflict back to Humphrey" (p. 80).
Humphrey is important to Leuchtenburg in another respect. He
suggests that Roosevelt wanted significantly to increase the role of
the FTC as an activist, watchdog agency by noting that two early
New Deal statutes - the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933
and the Securities Act of that same year - anticipated FTC supervision of trade-practices litigation and FTC enforcement of securities regulations. Roosevelt wanted to ensure that he had maximum
control over the FTC and other independent regulatory agencies so
that his administration could implement economic reform measures
unobstructed by partisan opposition. The politicization of the FTC
thus made up one part of Roosevelt's "new" activist approach to
the economic crisis that had swept him into office, and the Court's
refusal to allow him to control FTC personnel symbolized, in his
mind, its opposition to his approach. Leuchtenburg argues that
Humphrey confirmed for Roosevelt that the Court was "old" and
"out of touch" in its response to the issues he was facing.
Thus when Leuchtenburg turns in the next three chapters to the
Court-packing crisis and to West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,24 a case decided in the midst of that crisis, he already has established the inferential context in which the reader is to consider those
developments. The Court appears as, and to an important degree
is, a group of old men: old not only chronologically but, more important, ideologically. It seems an otherworldly and insensitive institution, prevented by its intellectual rigidity and its elitism from
responding to the unprecedented problems faced by the Roosevelt
administrations and, in particular, from recognizing their innovative
responses to those problems. For just as the Court was "old," the
framers of the New Deal were "new," both in their humanitarian
consciousness and their theories of governance.
The Court-packing crisis and the relationship of that crisis to the
constitutional revolution have been Leuchtenburg's particular area
24. 379 U.S. 379 (1937).

May 1996]

Supreme Court History

1407

of scholarly focus over the past several years. As such, his two
chapters on the origins, defeat, and consequences of the plan are
the most richly detailed and extensively supported in his book, with
ample attention to contemporary archival sources.25 I concern myself primarily with the three central arguments that Leuchtenburg
advances in those chapters. First, he argues that the plan symbolized the Roosevelt administration's perception that the Court's opposition to the New Deal was intractable: The old Court would
never fully be able to identify with the new governmental policies
proposed by Roosevelt and his supporters. Second, he claims that
the introduction of the Court-packing plan directly affected the
Court's short-term response to New Deal legislation. Finally, he
asserts that "[t]he Court struggle speeded the acceptance of a substantial change in the role of government and in the reordering of
property rights and also had the probably unanticipated result of
the appointment of Justices much more solicitous of civil liberties
and civil rights" (p. 162). It is "not surprising," Leuchtenburg states
as a conclusion to this last argument, "that historians speak of 'the
Constitutional Revolution of 1937,' for in the long history of the
Supreme Court, no event has had more momentous consequences
than Franklin Roosevelt's message of February 1937" (p. 162).
Pursuing each of those arguments in detail would vastly expand
the scope of this review and would require extensive exploration of
the lines of historical questioning that I address primarily in the review's next section. Here I want merely to give my impressionistic
reactions to the arguments. The reactions reflect some exposure to
the sources Leuchtenburg consults and to the work of other
scholars.26
25. These chapters rely heavily on quotations from contemporary sources to contrast the
old Court and the new policies of the Roosevelt administration. Leuchtenburg's use of the
quotations in his narrative is extremely effective: The quotations strongly support his argument that Roosevelt's attempt to tie the Court-packing plan to the age of the Justices was not
primarily an effort to articulate some purportedly neutral, nonpolitical criterion for replacing
members of the Court, but was instead a conscious attempt to draw on the perceived public
sentiment that the Court was old and out of touch. The only concern Leuchtenburg's use of
such sources raises for me is that the quotations may well not represent most responses to the
Court-packing plan. My own research suggests that the plan engendered a wide variety of
responses from persons who were politically loyal to Roosevelt.
26. Despite Leuchtenburg's longstanding investment in the Court-packing crisis and its
relationship to constitutional history in the New Deal period, he is not the only scholar concerned with those issues. Some recent work has proposed alternative accounts of the significance of the Court-packing episode. See, eg., Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal
Court,80 VA.L. REv. 201 (1994); Eben Moglen, Toward a New DealLegal History, 80 VA.L.
REv. 263 (1994); Michael Nelson, The President and the Court Reinterpreting the Courtpacking Episode of 1937, 103 PoL- Scr. Q. 267 (1988); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Rethinking
ConstitutionalChange, 80 VA. L. REv. 277 (1994); Devins, supra note 4. This scholarship,
taken together, suggests that we should view the crisis as part of a long, uneven, and complicated progression of developments in twentieth-century American constitutional jurisprudence and, more fundamentally, as a demonstration of the appearance of an altered theory of
constitutional government in America. This alternate theory conceived the appropriate role
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I believe that the first argument - that New Deal supporters
viewed the Court as old, both chronologically and ideologically provides an important clue to the historical character of the New
Deal period. It goes far to explain the major shift in thinking about
the role of government that Congress, the Executive branch, and
eventually the Court underwent during that period. That very perception on the part of New Deal supporters, however, coupled with
the pervasiveness and endurance of the accompanying conceptual
shift in attitudes toward governance, actually have obscured the distinctiveness of the New Deal and prevented its being readily
cabined in time. I amplify this reaction in the review's concluding
section.
My initial reaction to the second argument is that, although
Leuchtenburg seems significantly invested in the importance of the
Court-packing proposal, and although he firmly establishes its importance to Roosevelt and his aides who conceived it, his hypothesis of a direct connection between the introduction of the Courtpacking plan and the Court's short-run accommodation to New
Deal legislation in the 1936 Term is not adequately supported by his
own evidence.
Under an alternative, more credible hypothesis, the Courtpacking plan had only an indirect effect on the Court's eventual
embrace of New Deal regulatory legislation. This hypothesis emphasizes the following historical facts. The introduction of the plan
precipitated Congressional action to increase the retirement benefits for Justices over seventy27 within three years. Three justices indined to find New Deal legislation constitutionally dubious
responded to these new incentives and retired. Three strong supporters of Roosevelt's policies replaced them and the Court now
had a decisive majority sympathetic to the New Deal's legislative
agenda. Assuming that sympathy precipitated the constitutional
revolution of the late 1930s and 1940s, one could argue that the
revolution was set in motion by the creation of incentives for Justices to retire by a Congress sympathetic to Roosevelt.
Of course that hypothesis risks proving too much. Between
1937 and 1941 Roosevelt had not merely three, but eight appointments to the Supreme Court. All of his appointees, including
Harlan Fiske Stone, whom he promoted from Associate Justice to
of the Supreme Court not so much as a guardian of the boundaries between the "public" and
"private" spheres but as an active participant, at least with respect to issues involving governmental regulation of the economy, in dissolving those boundaries and extending the reach of
affirmative government. It characterizes the Court-packing episode not as a cause of change
but as a symptom of change.
27. See Act of March 1, 1937, ch. 21, 50 Stat. 24. For a discussion of the Act's history
between 1935 and its eventual adoption shortly after the Court-packing proposal first appeared, see Cushman, supra note 26, at 214-15.
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Chief Justice, were directly connected to the Roosevelt administra-

tion as appointed officials, were indirectly connected as advisors, or
were known to sympathize with the policy agenda of the New

Deal.28 This raises the possibility that the constitutional revolution
primarily resulted from actuarially driven fortuities in the appointments process. But Leuchtenburg, although mentioning that when
Roosevelt introduced the Court-packing plan he was aware of Justice Willis Van Devanter's prospective retirement, argues that
Roosevelt did not regard any one vacancy as decisive, partly because he was uncertain about the commitment of several Justices to
the New Deal's agenda and partly because he had promised the
next vacancy on the Court to Senator Joseph Robinson of Arkansas, a "65-year old conservative" who was the floor manager of the
Court-packing plan (pp. 144-45). Leuchtenburg also contemptuously dismisses actuarially oriented explanations of the constitutional revolution. 2 9
With respect to Leuchtenburg's third argument, I believe that
the Court-packing plan itself, as distinguished from the changes in
personnel to which it may have indirectly contributed, had almost

nothing to do with the "speed[ing of] the acceptance of a substantial change in the role of government" (p. 162) and nothing to do
with the appointment of Justices who were more solicitous of
civil liberties or, for that matter, with the developments that
Leuchtenburg associates in his last chapter with the "birth of
America's second bill of rights" (p. 237).
The role of government did change substantially during the New
Deal, as I previously have suggested, but that change was already
underway before the Court-packing plan appeared. Indeed, the
plan can be seen as a direct response to the Court's resistance to
that change, and that resistance continued until at least the early
1940s. By then the Court-packing plan was long since moribund,
28. The appointees in that time period were Hugo Black, Stanley Reed, Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas, Frank Murphy, Harlan Fiske Stone (moving from Associate Justice to Chief Justice), James Byrnes, and Robert Jackson. At the time of their appointments
Reed, Douglas, Murphy, Byrnes, and Jackson held various positions in the federal government to which they had been appointed by Roosevelt. Black was a pro-New Deal U.S.
Senator and Frankfurter a close unofficial advisor to Roosevelt on a variety of issues. Only
Stone, who was a Calvin Coolidge appointee, could be said to be other than a New Deal
Democrat, but he had been one of the most consistent supporters of New Deal policies on
the Court between 1933 and his appointment to the Chief Justiceship in 1941.
29. In 1977 a political historian used probability theory to argue that given the age of the
Justices on the Court after the 1936 election, Roosevelt would have had at least one vacancy
in his second term. See R.J. Morrison, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Supreme Court An
Example of the Use of ProbabilityTheory in PoliticalHistory, 16 HIST.& TEMoRy 137 (1977).
Citing a methodological critique of Morrison and a comment by a retired Circuit Court judge
that "[j]udges and other pensioners rarely die seasonably," Leuchtenburg concludes that
Morrison's article relied "on assumptions so fallacious that it must have set back quantitative
history for a generation." P. 281 n.92.

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 94:1392

and the new Roosevelt appointees were in place. Other sectors of
American society may have implicitly accepted the change as early
as 1936 when Roosevelt was overwhelmingly reelected,
but that
30
election took place before the introduction of the plan.
Leuchtenburg also associates the plan with the emergence of
Justices who were inclined to be supportive of civil liberties, but
there is no evidence that a concern for civil liberties played any part
in Roosevelt's decision to introduce the plan, or, for that matter, in
his calculus for appointing Supreme Court Justices. The Court and
New Deal legislators clashed over issues of economic regulation.
Civil liberties issues, on the other hand, only sporadically appeared
on the Court's agenda during Roosevelt's first two terms.31 Of the
Justices Roosevelt appointed to the Court, some did end up being
prominent supporters of civil liberties later in their judicial careers,
but between 1937 and 1941 the Roosevelt appointees were openly
divided on those civil liberties cases - primarily First Amendment
cases - that the Court entertained.3 2 Furthermore, Roosevelt's
appointments of Hugo Black, a former member of the Ku Klux
Klan, Stanley Reed, a native of Kentucky, and James Byrnes, a resident of South Carolina and an opponent of desegregation, hardly
would have been encouraging to those interested in promoting the
civil rights of blacks. In short, it seems accurate to say that the
Court, in the two decades beginning in 1937, heard and decided far
more noneconomic civil liberties cases than it had in the past two
decades, a fact that is itself historically significant. To suggest that
the Court did so because its New Deal appointees were themselves
"civil libertarians," however, seems an oversimplification, and not
even Leuchtenburg is prepared to suggest a direct connection between the Court-packing plan and a heightened interest in civil liberties issues (p. 162).
I now want to turn back to Leuchtenburg's second argument,
because it is the inferential centerpiece of his narrative. I have sug30. The plan was introduced in a special message by Roosevelt on February 5, 1937. See
p. 133.
31. See Michael Klarman, ConstitutionalFact/ConstitutionalFiction, 44 STAN. L. REV.
759, 791 (1992) (expressing skepticism about the connection between the New Deal validation of activist government and the emergence of popular support for civil liberties). Responding to Klarman's article, Leuchtenburg notes that although no evidence exists that "the
Court in 1937 was prepared to go as far in the realm of civil rights as it would subsequently,"
the "more expansive reading of the commerce clause by the Roosevelt Court opened the way
for the civil rights decisions of the Warren Court." P. 299 n.96. He asserts that the Courtpacking crisis "had the probably unanticipated result of the appointment of Justices much
more solicitous of civil liberties and civil rights." P. 162. Only two of Roosevelt's appointees,
however, Black and Douglas, were prominent civil libertarians on the Warren Court. Reed,
Frankfurter, and Jackson could not be described as such.
32. For an illustration, see Harry Hirsch's discussion of the tensions within the Stone
Court over the flag-salute cases and other civil liberties cases between 1939 and 1942, H.N.
Hmsci-, THE ENIOMA oF FEUX FRANKFURTER 147-76 (1981).
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gested that Chapters One through Three create the emotive theme

of a juxtaposition of the insensitivity of "old" men on the Court and
the plight of the economically disadvantaged in Depression-ridden
industrial America.3 3 Chapters Seven through Nine create an emotive theme as well, the coming of the "new order," exemplified by
the appointment of Hugo Black to the Court, the constitutional
revolution of 1937, and the "second birth of the Bill of Rights" after

1937.34
In between, Chapters Four through Six discuss the Courtpacking plan and its allegedly direct connection to the constitutional revolution. Chapters Four and Five pick up the earlier emotive theme, emphasizing the obsolescence of the Old Court,
Roosevelt's perception that the Court's chronological and ideological age would prevent it from ever accommodating itself to the New
Deal, the reinforcement of that perception by his advisors and
members of the public, and Roosevelt's willingness to press the
Court-packing plan on Congress, even though he knew it was extremely controversial and even though he had secured a nomination to the Court with Justice Van Devanter's May 1937 retirement.
Roosevelt, Leuchtenburg suggests, wanted not just to replace one
"old" Justice but to rejuvenate the entire Court (pp. 81-162).
33. Leuchtenburg describes William Humphrey in much the same way that he described
Justice Holmes in chapter 1 and Justice Roberts in chapter 2. He quotes the "Progressive"
Senator George Norris of Nebraska, who called Humphrey "the greatest reactionary in the
country," indifferent to "the toiling millions of... honest, common people [who need to be]
protected in their rights as against big business." P. 54.
34. Leuchtenburg's chapter on Black's appointment particularly advances this emotive
theme. Leuchtenburg states that Roosevelt probably knew about Black's Ku Klux Klan affiliations, and that there is "no evidence.., that awareness of this past caused Roosevelt to
think twice about appointing Black." P. 208. He also concedes that "it is improbable, given
the temper of the times, that civil liberties considerations loomed large in his mind in deciding upon a nominee." P. 208. Nonetheless, he chooses to emphasize that Black's reputation
as a judge principally rested on his status as "a dissenter [who urged] the Court to break new
ground on civil liberties." P. 203. With that image of Black in place, Leuchtenburg then
sketches the following symbolic portrait of Black:
The President's trust in Black's liberal proclivities proved well founded. So faithful
was Justice Black to the tenets of the New Deal that it was even rumored that Tommy
Corcoran wrote his opinions. "Although Black's appointment did not mark the precise
chronological point from which the Court's philosophy began its deviation from its previous path," one of his biographers... remarked, "it was this event which made it plain
beyond all doubt that the Court was about to be reconstituted in the image of the New
Deal." ...
Black's appointment turned out to be only the first of many for the President, and in
nominating this outspoken liberal, he set the pattern that most of the other selections for
"the Roosevelt Court" would follow. To the Supreme Court would go progressives ...
who shared Black's enthusiasm for the New Deal. The typical appointee would, like
Black, be several years younger than President William Howard Taft's representative
choice.
Pp. 211-12 (citations omitted).
Black thus emerges as a prototypical representative of the New Court that fostered the
constitutional revolution, and his image as a civil libertarian serves to associate that proclivity
with both the Roosevelt Court and the revolution itself.
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Those chapters also contain Leuchtenburg's claim that "[t]he
threat of Court-packing... may well have affected [Justice] Roberts's vote in later cases" (p. 143). He advances that claim in the
following paragraphs:
On March 29, [1937,] by 5-4 in the Parrish case with Justice Roberts
joining the majority, the Court upheld a minimum wage statute from
the state of Washington that to most people seemed identical to the
New York law it had wiped out in Tipaldo less than a year before.
Two weeks later, Roberts joined in a series of 5-4 decisions finding
the National Labor Relations Act constitutional. On May 24, the
Court validated the Social Security law. These rulings marked a historic change in constitutional doctrine. The Court was now stating
that local and national governments had a whole range of powers that
this same tribunal had been saying for the past two years these governments did not have.
The crucial development was the switch of Justice Roberts, which
converted a 5-4 division against New Deal legislation to 5-4 in favor.
Since 1937 the Court has not struck down a single piece of Congressional legislation constraining business. Although before 1937
legal realism influenced only a few Justices, thereafter the old doctrines of constitutional fundamentalism lost out. Whereas the beneficiaries of the Court before 1937 had been businessmen and other
propertied interests, after 1937 they became less advantaged groups.
As early as the first week in June 1937, Business Week was complaining: "The cold fact is that, for all practical purposes, the reorganization of the Court, sought by legislative process, has been
accomplished by the ordinary process of court decision." [pp. 142,
154-55]

The characterization of history in the above paragraphs is intended to provide support for Leuchtenburg's argument about the
connection between the plan and the constitutional revolution.
Several scholars, however, have found it to be overly simple. They
have pointed out that decisions of the Court prior to the New Deal
made even greater departures from previous constitutional jurisprudence, and that they thereby demonstrate the Court's readiness
to accept significantly altered conceptions of the scope of governmental power to regulate the economy.3 5 They have noted, in addition, that the Old Court, including the Justices who dissented in
Parrish,supported several pieces of New Deal legislation;3 6 that
Justice Roberts himself convincingly denied "switching" his vote in
the Tipaldo and Parrishcases;3 7 and that the initial resistance of the
35. See, e.g., Barry Cushman, A Stream of Legal Consciousness: The Current of Commerce Decisionsfrom Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 105 (1992).
36. See, e.g., Cushman, supra note 26, at 246; Devins, supra note 4, at 252-53.
37. See Richard D. Friedman, Switching 77me and Other Thought Experiments: The
Hughes Court and ConstitutionalTransformation. 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891, 1949-53 (1994).
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Court to New Deal legislation may have been a response to the
vague and clumsy language of some of the statutes passed by Congress in 1933.38
Although Leuchtenburg is aware of much of this scholarship, he
discounts its importance. The manner in which he does so is suggestive. His most extended discussion of the scholarship critiquing
his causal connection theory comes in a passage in which he addresses the issue of whether there was "a Constitutional Revolution" at all. That seems odd, because none of the critics deny that a
considerable shift in constitutional jurisprudence took place in the
late 1930s and early 1940s. They merely disagree with
Leuchtenburg's assertion that the Court-packing plan caused that
shift. When Leuchtenburg discusses his critics, however, he seems
to act as if they threaten the whole of his historical enterprise - his
effort to show that the Supreme Court was "reborn" in the New
Deal period - if they place the origins of the constitutional revolution other than "in the pivotal year of 1937."3 9
Why should Leuchtenburg regard the pinpointing of the origins
of the constitutional revolution at the Court's response to
Roosevelt's introduction of the Court-packing plan in 1937 as so
necessary to his whole enterprise in The Supreme Court Reborn?
The plan, as he points out, failed, but the constitutional revolution
occurred anyway: from 1937 through 1946 the Court reversed
thirty-two of its earlier decisions, eight of which had been unanimous (p. 233). Thus, when Leuchtenburg concludes his chapter on
the constitutional revolution with the statement that "[i]n 1937 the
Supreme Court began a revolution in jurisprudence that ended, apparently forever, the reign of laissez-faire and legitimated the arrival of the Leviathan State" (p. 236), one might not find the
statement particularly controversial. Yet that statement, it seems to
me, captures better than any other sentence in The Supreme Court
38. See PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 10-13 (1982); Nelson, supranote 26,

at 289; Devins, supra note 4, at 251, 264-65.
39. P. 231. Consider these features of Leuchtenburg's response. First, he asserts that
"some commentators... deny that there was a Constitutional Revolution in 1937 or. . . insist
that the conception be severely qualified." P. 230. He then cites two constitutional historians, Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison, for the proposition that "[t]he 'revolution' of
1937 did not break the continuity of American constitutional development in any decisive
respect. In that sense it was not a revolution at all." P. 230.
He then says, in a footnote, "In 1994 a historian contemptuously dismissed the conclusion
of two generations of scholars that 1937 was a watershed as a 'bedtime story.'" P. 318 n.95.
His reference is to Cushman, supra note 26, but Cushman's article is not an attempt to deny
that a constitutional revolution occurred. Instead, Cushman argues that the revolution cannot be said to have taken place within the limited timespan of the 1937 Term, nor to have had
a significant causal connection to the introduction of the Court-packing plan. See Cushman,
supra note 26, at 206-07. Leuchtenburg, however, apparently takes Cushman's arguments as
directed at the entire constitutional revolution thesis. He includes Cushman in the category
of "some commentators" quoted above, placing the footnote reference to Cushman immediately after "not a revolution at all." See p. 230.
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Reborn the inferential message that Leuchtenburg wants to convey
to his readers.
Leuchtenburg's message is that at the heart of the cultural crisis
of the New Deal was a crisis in constitutionallaw, and at the heart
of that crisis was the question of whether the Supreme Court would
"legitimate the arrival of the Leviathan State" (p. 236). When the
Court initially declined to do so, an overwhelmingly popular Executive sought to transform its institutional composition, to secure that
legitimation by "packing" the Court with "new" Justices. Despite
Roosevelt's popularity, which signaled that the American people
had accepted his conception of "the Leviathan State," his plan to
pack the Court failed. The failure of the Court-packing plan,
Leuchtenburg concludes, had massive potential ramifications, because it broke the momentum of Roosevelt's legislative partnership
with Congress. In Leuchtenburg's words, the Court-packing failure
"blunt[ed] the most important drive for social reform in American
history and squandered the advantage of Roosevelt's triumph in
1936" (p. 157). This could have been a tragic episode.
Instead, the Court-packing crisis was a watershed, a great triumph, the beginnings of "our" world. The arrival of the Leviathan
State came into being through judicialdecisions. A potential political revolution derailed, but in its place came judicial legitimation of
the radical transformation of the role of government in America
that the New Deal legislation represented. The Leviathan State
came into being through a series of Court decisions that transformed the meaning of the Constitution. Furthermore, the socially
and economically disadvantaged - the Carrie Bucks and the discharged railroad workers - became the beneficiaries of that constitutional revolution. The state gained the power to respond to the
casualties of modem industrial capitalism, and the Court, in its revolutionary mission, began to extend the Constitution's protection of
civil liberties. As Leuchtenburg puts it:
The Constitutional Revolution of 1937 altered fundamentally the
character of the Court's business, the nature of its decisions, and the
alignment of its friends and foes. From the Marshall Court to the
Hughes Court, the judiciary had been largely concerned with questions of property rights. After 1937, the most significant matters on
the docket were civil liberties and other personal rights.... For more
than a century before 1937, the Court had been inclined to safeguard
entrenched interests from reform-minded legislatures. But after the
Constitutional Revolution... "[t]he businessman, so long the Court's
darling, was shorn of his constitutional fleece." [p. 2351
At first this seems a breathtakingly inaccurate statement. As
noted, civil rights and civil liberties cases, unlike cases involving
state and federal regulation of the economy, occupied a small part
of the Court's constitutional agenda until the mid 1950s.
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Leuchtenburg, however, does not mean to equate "significant" with
"numerous." He means instead that in the constitutional revolution
the "entrenched interests" whose "property fights" had hitherto received such solicitude from the Court lost that solicitude to despised and disadvantaged minorities, the archetypal plaintiffs of
civil liberties cases. In Leuchtenburg's history, the Court since the
New Deal has taken pains not only to legitimate the role of the
Leviathan State as the regulator of the businessman and the entrenched interests, but also to ensure that that government will not
trample on the civil rights of the very sorts of persons harmed by
the laissez-faire approach of the Old Court.
This meaning of the constitutional revolution is captured in
Leuchtenburg's chapter on Parrish, the case that by legitimating
many state minimum-wage laws and overruling a fifteen-year-old
precedent to the contrary4° "detonated" the revolution (p. 178). In
that chapter Leuchtenburg creates a telling pictorial contrast between Elsie Parrish and Justice George Sutherland, a contrast
designed to convey the inferential message of his history.
Parrish was a chambermaid in a Wenatchee, Washington, hotel
who "worked irregularly... cleaning toilets and sweeping rugs for
an hourly wage of twenty-two cents" (p. 164). When she was discharged in 1935 she asked for back pay in the amount of $216.19.
In arriving at this sum, she relied on a 1913 statute that set the minimum wage for chambermaids at $14.50 a week. After the hotel offered to settle for a total of $17.00, Parrish brought suit. The hotel
defended itself by challenging the constitutionality of the minimumwage statute (p. 164). In light of the Court's precedents, 4 1 Parrish's
chances of having the Washington statute sustained appeared virtually nonexistent, but "[s]he was determined to carry on her struggle" (p. 167).
When Parrish's claim eventually prevailed at the Court, with
Justice Roberts joining the majority, she said, "I am happier over
what it will mean to the working women of the state than over the
money I will receive .... There have been thousands of girls and
women working for whatever they could get in this state, and now
they'll get a break" (p. 179). Parrish then "faded into the anonymity from which she had risen," but she could not obscure that "she
had accomplished something of historic significance - less for herself than for the thousands of women scrubbing floors in hotels,
toiling at laundry vats, and tending machines in factories who
needed to know, however belatedly, they could summon the law to
their side" (p. 179).
40. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
41. In the Term before Parrishthe Court had reaffirmed and extended Adkins to state
minimum-wage legislation in Morehead v. New York ex rel ipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
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According to Leuchtenburg, after Chief Justice Hughes announced the opinion in Parrish,he "nodded to Justice Sutherland
seated to his left." With this nod Sutherland, who had produced a
dissenting opinion for four justices in the case,
surveyed the chamber silently, almost diffidently, then picked up the
sheaf of papers in front of him and began to read. Sensing his day had
passed, Sutherland - who, with his pince-nez, high collar, goatee,
and hair parted in middle, seemed never to have left the nineteenth
century - appeared barely able to bring himself to carry out his futile
assignment.
It was beyond dispute, he asserted, that the due process clause
embraced freedom of contract, and Sutherland remained convinced,
too, that women stood on an equal plane with men and that legislation denying them a right to contract for work was discriminatory.
"Certainly a suggestion that the bargaining ability of the average
woman is not equal to the average man would lack substance," he
declared. "The ability to make a fair bargain, as everyone knows,
does not depend on sex."
If anyone thought that those last sentences had a hint of jocularity,
they quite misperceived Sutherland's mood. The Parrish decision
blew taps for the nineteenth-century world, and Sutherland, born in
England in 1862 and reared on the Utah frontier, knew it. Having
had his say, he understood that there was no point in going on any
longer ... [He carefully laid his opinion on the dais and, sternvisaged, settled back in his chair. [pp. 173, 175]
The portraits of Parrish and Sutherland are of a piece with the
inferential narrative structure of The Supreme Court Reborn.
Parish- Leuchtenburg's pivotal case, the case that began the constitutional revolution, the case that ended "apparently forever" the
laissez-faire regime and gave constitutional legitimacy to the Leviathan State - counterpoised two symbolic participants in that
revolution, the Justices of the Old Court, and their former casualties, now the beneficiaries of the New Court. Parrish gives thanks
that she and "the thousands of women scrubbing floors, toiling at
laundry vats, and tending machines in factories" can now "summon
the law to [our] side" (p. 179). Justice Sutherland, who seemed
"never to have left the nineteenth century," knows that with Parrish
the "revolution" has begun, "bl[owing] taps" for his "nineteenthcentury world." Leuchtenburg expects the rest of us to recognize
the scene as the beginnings of our own time. He expects us to see
that the Parrishdecision, prompted by the same conflict of forces
that precipitated the Court-packing crisis, ended the regime of laissez-faire and ushered in the Welfare State, "apparently forever."
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CONCLUSION:

CABIeNIG THE NEW DEAL

IN

TIMvE

Suppose one tried to make sense of the constitutional history of
the New Deal not by accepting the inferential messages of
Leuchtenburg's narrative but by treating them with skepticism.
Suppose one were to assume that the consequences of the constitutional revolution - a Court-sponsored abandonment of laissezfaire and entrenchment of the Leviathan State - cannot fairly be
treated as permanent features of American life. Suppose one were
to point to current efforts to "downsize" government, to curtail programs of state and federal largesse, and to deregulate commercial
and industrial enterprise as signals that the efficacy of a vast public
sphere dominated by the presence of affirmative government might
no longer be taken for granted.
Then perhaps one might want to know more about some features of the constitutional history of the New Deal that
Leuchtenburg's account virtually ignores. One might want to know
more about the theoretical basis of the "Leviathan State" - that is,
why government came to be thought of as a natural and necessary
presence in American life, as a source of solutions to perceived social and economic problems, and as an apt compliment to the new
world of modernity. In addition, one might want to know more
about the alternative conceptions of government, and of the private
and public spheres of a republican polity, that the constitutional
revolution displaced.
Further, one might want to know why the period of the New
Deal ended up being the moment when our government abandoned
the traditional republican conception of the relationship between
the liberties and powers of the individual citizen and the powers of
and limitations on government. In that vein, one might want to explore the cultural status, in the decades leading up to the New Deal,
of certain epistemological assumptions - assumptions about the
nature of humankind, about the function of society, and about the
place of human and external agents in the universe - that
animated a conception of government as having only specially conferred, limited powers and of individual citizens as having general
freedoms, subject only to special limitations. One also might want
to discern how those epistemological assumptions came to erode
around the time of the New Deal, so that government came to be
conceived of as having general powers to regulate human activity,
subject only to special limitations, and individual citizens came to
be conceived of as having only special freedoms against
government.
Finally, one also might want to know how the concepts of a
"public purpose" or the "public interest," traditionally limited to a
few specific sets of activities, widened under the Leviathan State to
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include virtually any realm of human endeavor. One might want to
know, correspondingly, why the private realm of autonomous
human activity, initially taken as vast and self-regulable, came to be
narrowed to the point that a public-private distinction itself seemed
conceptually incoherent.
The cases of the constitutional revolution implicate all of these
issues. To get at such issues, however, we must stop categorizing
the positions taken by the judges who resisted New Deal legislation
as old, outmoded, or smacking of laissez-faire and attempt to understand how sensible persons could have adopted them. We must
suspend judgment on the efficacy of their starting assumptions or,
alternatively, consider the possibility that those assumptions might
be treated as plausible or even cogent in a post-New Deal world.
At the least, we should try to understand why such assumptions
suddenly seemed wrongheaded, or old, in the early 1930s.
In short, we need to recreate the world of Sutherland's dissent
in Parrish,not as a history in which the majority in that case won,
but as a historical universe in which the premises of Sutherland's
dissent seemed as natural and necessary as Leuchtenburg takes the
premises of New Deal government to be. Having done so, we then
can recreate the set of assumptions held by Sutherland's critics.
Those critics felt that traditional conceptions of the role of government in America needed to be recast, despite the fact that constitutional jurisprudence at the time of Roosevelt's first election in 1932
supported Sutherland. Indeed, as traditionally interpreted, the
Constitution anticipated and reinforced a world of limited government. A revolution needed to take place to usher in the Leviathan
State. Why did it take place in the 1930s?
The materials are in place to pursue such questions. Consider,
first, some salient characteristics of the period between the 1870s
and the early 1930s in America. The external appearance of American society became discernibly more urban and industrial. This appearance reflected several underlying material changes. For
example, the proportion of the population living in urban centers
increased from about 16% to about 49%. The total value of manufactured products increased twentyfold. The miles of railroad track
went from less than 40,000 to more than 260,000.42 At the same
time, an established theory of causal attribution in the universe one that located causes in phenomena independent of human actors, such as religion, nature, universalistic "laws" of political economy, a preordained status system, or the inevitably cyclical pattern
of change over time - gradually was replaced as epistemological
42. See HARRY N. SCHEMER ET AL, AMERICAN ECONoMIc HIsToRY 222 fig. 15-1, 243
tbl. 16-1, 260 fig. 17-1, 335 tbl. 21-1 (9th ed. 1976).
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orthodoxy by a theory that identified43human consciousness and
human will as the central causal agent.
If we assume that many Americans who experienced the economic dislocations of the late 1920s and early 1930s had a simultaneous sense of the massive external changes that had taken place in
their recent history and the implications of an epistemology that
assumed that humans not only had produced those changes but
could alter their impact, policies expanding the role of government
to alleviate the perceived costs of urbanization and industrialization
can be seen as a culturally plausible response. If, however, we assume that other Americans in the same period, experiencing the
same dislocations, would attribute them to forces over which
humans had no significant control, we can imagine how proposals
for affirmative governmental action to redirect the course of industrialization or urbanization would be regarded as heretical and
futile.
Thus a promising framework for recreating competing theories
of governance in the New Deal period might center on the following questions. To what extent were previous orthodox theories of
governance, which stressed the limited range of public power and
the public sphere, consistent with traditional theories of externally
derived causal attribution? To what extent could such theories explain the dramatic external changes that had taken place in American life between the Civil War and the New Deal and suggest how
government should respond to these changes? Alternatively, to
what extent were the alternative theories of governance proposed
by New Dealers consistent with human-centered theories of causal
attribution? To what extent could those theories explain the social
and economic dislocations of the late 1920s and early 1930s and
propose governmental "solutions"?
Recent scholarship in late nineteenth- and early twentiethcentury constitutional history has begun to explore the shift that
took place in theories of governance, in the relationship between
the private and public spheres of a republicanist polity, and in the
constitutional status of governmental powers and individual liberties in Supreme Court cases and commentary from the 1870s
through the 1920s. 4 Additional scholarship has begun to establish
43. See Ross, supranote 1, at 1-2 (associating the challenge with "modernism" and identifying as its central premise the belief that humans can shape experience to conform to their
own perceptions).
44. See GILLMAN, supra note 21, at 102-90; MARK GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE
SPnaCH 17-95 (1991); Howard Gillman, PreferredFreedoms: The ProgressiveExpansion of
State Powerand the Rise of Modern Civil Liberties Jurisprudence,47 PoL REs. Q. 623, 634-46
(1994). See generally Charles W. McCurdy, The 'Liberty of Contract' Regime in American
Law, in FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND THE STATE (Harry W. Scheiber ed., forthcoming
1997); Cushman, supra note 26; Cushman, supra note 35; Friedman, supra note 37.
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the striking durability of "premodernist" theories of causal attribution in a late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century American environment that had come to assume the characteristics of
modernity.45 A final suggestive branch of work, by cultural historians, has begun to focus on the comparatively late emergence of the
ideology of democracy, as distinguished from the ideology of repuiblicanism, as a defining political philosophy for Americans.4 6 Each
of these lines of inquiry offers the promise of contributing to a "new
history" of law and the New Deal, one in which constitutional and
other developments would be seen as situated within a period of
dramatic, rapid - and to contemporaries, bewildering as well as
exciting - material dislocation and epistemological ferment.4 7
Leuchtenburg undertakes virtually no exploration of such questions because he assumes that we either "know" the answers or the
answers do not matter. We know that the old regime failed to protect Carrie Buck and Elsie Parrish and discharged laborers; we
know that the new regime looks to government to support such persons and to the courts to protect us all from excessive government
encroachments on our civil liberties. Moreover, Leuchtenburg suggests that it does not really matter why the New Deal generation
effected a revolutionary conceptual shift about governance, because
we are still in the midst of that shift and because we have a history
that makes the alternatives look bleak. The political program of
the New Deal metamorphosized into the judicial program of the
Warren Court, and the legacy of both has come down to us.
But what if we would like to reexamine the costs and benefits of
the Leviathan State, or at least to distinguish between a blithe acceptance of its assumptions and a knowledgeable understanding of
how those assumptions came to be put into place? And what if we
45. See, eg., Dorothy Ross, ModernistSocialScience in the Land of the New/Old, in MOD.
ERNIST Im ULsEs, supra note 1, at 171-89.
46. See, eg., ROBERT WiBE, SELF-RuLE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 181-222 (1995).

47. For a preliminary analysis of the Court-packing crisis employing this framework, see
G. Edward White, Recapturing New Deal Lawyers, 102 HARv. L. Rnv. 489 (1988) (book
review), which contains the following paragraph:
Another event confirming modernist perspectives was the "crisis" that produced the
Court-packing episode of 1937. The recognition of a "crisis" has conventionally been
described as a belief that an "old Court" was declaring constitutional doctrine that was
"outmoded" because it failed to legitimate the legislative and administrative experiments of the New Deal. But the belief that a "crisis" existed reflected more than dissatisfaction with specific Court decisions. It also encompassed an intuitive rejection of the
Court's reasoning that the New Deal legislation offended the Constitution. The Court's
critics intuited that the Constitution must have been erroneously interpreted in the New
Deal cases because their Constitution was a modernist document that could accommodate change and respond to political and economic chaos. If the Court failed to perceive
the modernist nature of the Constitution, it was because its Justices were "outmoded" in
their sensibility. They were trapped in a premodernist theory of Constitutional interpretation that stemmed from a premodernist conception of the document.
Id. at 516 (footnote omitted).
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were to find during that reexamination that the starting premises of
the New Deal generation, premises that so decisively altered the
boundary between the public and private spheres of American life,
were themselves as historically contingent as the traditional premises about governance that they supplanted? Then we might no
longer have the inspiring example of the New Deal and its accompanying constitutional revolution to serve as a guide for the resolution of contemporary political and legal issues, but we also might
have begun to cabin the New Deal in time. We might then learn
something more about ourselves and how we currently want to govern and to be governed.

